Introduction

6
There are two main types of advance directives. One type simply designates a 7 substitute decision-maker, sometimes called a healthcare agent, proxy or surrogate.
8
A more comprehensive advance directive (sometimes called a living will) specifies 9 particular principles or considerations intended to guide action with regard to 10 specific future healthcare decisions and possible medical conditions (Jaworska 11 2009).
12
At the time an advance directive is composed, the individual anticipates a future 13 situation in which s/he (1) will have lost decision-making capacity and (2) will be in 26 Western European states, the wishes expressed in an advance directive have to 27 be respected regardless of the type and stage of disease (Vollmann 2012) , unless 28 the directive is legally invalid. However, patients have no claim right-i.e. they 29 have no right to demand particular treatments, especially when these are expected 30 to be futile (see e.g. Engelhardt 1989 ). Instead, patients have the right to consent to 31 or refuse a particular recommended treatment, since every medical treatment 32 represents an intrusion into a person's physical and mental integrity and therefore 33 requires consent.
34
In many cases, a more or less broad range of interpretation is needed with regard 35 to the meaning and implementation of an individual's healthcare decisions made in 36 advance of their illness. This interpretative process is guided by a number of legal 37 standards and ethical criteria, designed to avoid the traps of paternalism and neglect 38 of autonomy. Advance directives are designed to ensure that individual wishes expressed when 45 the person was competent to do so are still respected in the event of decision-46 making incapacity. Ideally, the wishes formulated in the advance directive are in 47 accordance with the patient's current best interests. However, the wishes expressed 48 in the advance directive may sometimes be regarded as contrary to the incompetent 49 patient's well-being.
50
According to Olick (2001) , advance directives reflect "critical interests" with 51 regard to personal dignity and well-being. Therefore, they have to be respected even 52 if they conflict with current sensations of pleasure and pain. In this case, respect for 53 autonomy-one of the four bioethical principles advocated by Beauchamp and 54 Childress (2001) -is given more weight than the principle of beneficence. One 1 Verbally expressed wishes are often taken into account in exploring the presumed wishes of the patient. However, they are clearly less authoritative than a properly executed written document. In the US, medical orders for life-sustaining treatment (MOLST) are treated like advance directives even though they are not initiated by the patient; they merely record the healthcare provider's conversation with the patient in the form of an order kept in the patient's medical record and applicable across various healthcare locations, such as hospitals, nursing homes, ambulances, hospices and the patient's home. that their daughter died instantly, whereas in fact she suffered a dreadful death. 
89
Paternalistic behaviour may be characterized as weak (soft) or strong. According 90 to weak paternalism, "a man can rightly be prevented from harming himself 91 (when other interests are not directly involved) only if his intended action is 92 substantially nonvoluntary or can be presumed to be so in the absence of evidence 93 to the contrary" (Feinberg 1971 ). Strong paternalism is embraced when a person is 94 protected "against his will, from the harmful consequences even of his fully 95 voluntary choices and undertakings" (Feinberg 1971) .
96
An example of weak paternalism is the situation in which a patient specifies in 97 his advance directive a desire to continue taking some sort of complementary 98 medication; his physician, however, discovers that the medication causes signifi-99 cant harm to the patient, which she presumes the patient was not aware of. As she 100 can no longer discuss this with the patient, who is now incompetent, she overrides 101 the patient's advance directive, stopping the treatment for the patient's benefit.
102
An example of strong paternalism is a case where a patient whose valid advance 103 directive clearly states that he refuses hospitalization for any medical reason is 104 hospitalized overnight to receive intravenous hydration for life-threatening 105 dehydration.
106
The motivation for potentially justifiable-weak or strong-paternalism is usu-107 ally the desire to avoid harm (non-maleficence) and/or to benefit the person whose 108 autonomy is overridden or compromised. 118 
Respect for Autonomy
119 Autonomy or self-determination is a person's ability to make his or her own self-120 guided decisions. The principle of respect for autonomy obligates healthcare 121 professionals to honour competent patients' informed, voluntary decisions.
122
According to Ronald Dworkin (1993) , a person with the capacity for autonomy 123 needs (1) the ability to espouse a "genuine preference or character or conviction or a 124 sense of self", which could be called the ability to value, and (2) the ability to act 125 out of one's sense of conviction, which Jaworska (2009) calls "the ability to enact 126 one's values in the complex circumstances of the real world". These crucial abilities 127 are missing in many disorders, such as severe dementia or loss of consciousness.
128
If it is possible to apply a specific advance directive directly to a given situation, 129 a conflict between respect for autonomy and paternalism may not occur. In this 130 case, the expressed wishes can be transformed into action without restriction. It is especially difficult to assess retrospectively whether a patient had decision-171 making capacity at the time he or she composed an advance directive. Frequently, a 172 patient diagnosed as incompetent to make a particular healthcare decision has an 173 advance directive that was written many years ago. If, for instance, a patient suffers 174 from slow progressive dementia, it can be difficult to establish whether the person 175 was still competent 5 years ago when he or she wrote the advance directive. The 176 ethical criteria presented below can be used to test the moral appropriateness of 177 heeding the contents of an advance directive. In addition, it may be helpful to 178 interview relatives, friends, physicians and other care professionals who have been 179 in contact with the person over a longer period.
180
Free choice means that a person composing an advance directive has to be able 181 to make an autonomous decision and to communicate the choice without feeling 182 threatened, under duress or external pressure. Ideally, the living will originates from 183 a person's idiosyncratic substrate of wishes and values. According to Beauchamp 184 and Childress (2001), three conditions constitute an autonomous decision: (1) the 185 act was carried out intentionally, (2) the act was carried out with an understanding 186 of the important facts and circumstances and (3) the act was carried out without 187 external "controlling influences". 
216
The concept of authenticity has been extensively debated (e.g. Golomb 1995; 217 Wood et al. 2008 ). According to a widely shared position (Frankfurt 1988 are fairly uncontroversial as a matter of principle but may be applied more or 254 less strictly. Others, such as authenticity and a coherent value system, remain 255 controversial as regards both interpretation and appropriateness. Even so, they 256 capture important aspects of the debate on advance directives and can help to 257 articulate the reasons for moral disagreement.
258
The criteria discussed in this section focus on the choices expressed by a rational 259 individual moral agent. However, the situations advance directives aim to antici-260 pate are likely to be characterized to a great extent by dependence on others. It is 261 thus of interest to explore what a relational perspective can add to the discussion on 262 advance directives. The fundamental conflict between respect for autonomy and paternalism is part of 266 every social relationship. Alongside other ethical approaches, the ethics of care 267 (Held 2005) provides an important theoretical perspective on this conflict.
268
The ethics of care is a form of relational ethics in the sense that "its central focus 269 is on the compelling moral salience of attending to and meeting the needs of the 270 particular others for whom we take responsibility" (Held 2005) . The ethics of care 271 respects the fact that persons depend on others for most of their lives. The ethics of 272 care "addresses rather than neglects moral issues arising in relations among the 273 unequal and dependent, relations that are often emotion-laden and involuntary" 274 (Held 2005) . The family context is prototypical for such relations.
275
Degrees of dependence may vary over the life course; for instance, children or 276 persons in situations of illness or after accidents will need a lot of care. But even 277 healthy adults are likely not to be completely self-sufficient, but need others even 278 for their everyday professional and private activities. Later in life, many people 279 need care every day, and some individuals with disabilities may be dependent on 280 care throughout their lives.
281
Most people composing an advance directive do so with a view to a future 282 situation of involuntary dependence in which they need the care of others. Focusing 283 on individual preferences and trying to extend individual autonomy may not do 284 justice to the challenges posed by this new state of significant need and dependence.
285
On the other hand, advance directives are not necessarily antithetical to a care 286 perspective. The ethics of care does not postulate that there is no room for private 287 decisions that may also go against the expectations or wishes of close persons. 288 Advance directives can specify the relational network in which the individual is 289 situated and highlight trustful relationships. Also, advance directives need not be a 290 vote of no confidence in the treating physicians or caring relatives; they may even 291 serve as an "icebreaker", making it easier for healthcare professionals and relatives 292 to communicate about the patient's preferences and interests. Not surprisingly, 293 a randomized controlled study found that advance care planning including the formulation of an advance directive "improves end of life care and patient and 295 family satisfaction and reduces stress, anxiety, and depression in surviving 296 relatives" (Detering et al. 2010 
331
There may be other sources of potential bias: physicians may be more inclined to 332 implement an advance directive if they agree with the wishes expressed by the patient.
333
Thresholds for the validity of an advance directive might be raised when physicians
